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RICHARD D. KEARNEY*

Internal Limitations on External
Commitments -Article
46 of
the Treaties Convention
The United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties has completed
for submission to the nations of the world the most far-reaching codification effort in the field of international law that has thus far been attempted.
The basis of its work has been the seventy-five draft articles on the Law of
Treaties which were refined by the International Law Commission1 over a
period of fifteen years.
In the first session of the Conference that was held in Vienna from
March 26 to May 24, 1968, all seventy-five of the draft articles were
reviewed by the Committee of the Whole. Numerous amendments were
accepted, though those were only a fraction of the amendments proposed.
Sixty-nine draft articles were approved, of which three are new. One article
was deleted, and twelve articles, including three new articles, were deferred for further consideration by the Committee of the Whole at the
second session which began on April 8, 1969, in Vienna.
The deferred articles related, for the most part, to multilateral treaties
and are involved in the "all-States" issue, the Communist bloc attempt to
open the way for East Germany to become a party to "general multilateral
treaties". Another of the deferred articles, a new article 62 bis, related to
disputes-settlement procedure, a subject that the International Law Com2
mission draft left undetermined for all practical purposes.
*Ambassador, Office of the Legal Advisor, Department of State; Chairman, Secretary of
State's Advisory Committee on Private International Law; U.S. representative, Hague Conference on Private International Law; graduate University of Cincinnati Law School (LL.B);
member American Bar Association, American Society of International Law and Foreign
Service Association.
tArticle 46 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) is referred to in the
manuscript as Article 43 which is the number it had as a draft article. The full text of the
convention appears on pages 172-203.
'The draft articles and the Commission's Commentary thereon are reprinted in 61 AM. J.
INT'L L. 255.
2
Article 62 of the ILC draft provides that claims that a treaty should be terminated or
suspended on the ground that it is invalid, is not binding or has been materially breached, are
to be handled under Article 33 of the United Nations Charter-which is scarcely more than
an expression of pious hope that the parties will reach some agreed solution.
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At the second session of the Conference, which concluded on May 23,
1969, the open issues were, with very considerable effort, disposed of. The
"All States" issue was referred to the United Nations General Assembly,
where, as a political issue, it obviously belongs. A disputes-settlement
procedure was adopted that requires a mandatory conciliation procedure
for all disputes over the termination or suspension of a treaty because of
claims of invalidity, changes of circumstance, material breach and the other
grounds found in part 5 of the Convention. However, claims that a treaty is
void because of conflict with an imperative norm of international law (jus
cogens, Articles 53 and 64), are made subject to compulsory jurisdiction of
the International Court of Justice. Finally, in view of the innovative character of a number of articles, the Conference decided to include a specific
provision on the non-retroactivity of the Convention, under which it will
apply only to treaties that enter into force after the date of its own entry
into force.
In the articles that make up the convention the delegates grappled with
the old and the new, with form and substance, with such widely ranging
topics as pacta sunt servanda, rebus sic stantibus, interpretation, functions
of depositaries, correction of error in a text, and the effect of error upon
validity.
This effort to harness a horde of problems by the checkrein of a treaty
on treaties stems from the determination of the International Law Commission to provide solutions for every controverted issue in treaty law that
was not being handled under some other rubric by the Commission. 3 The
determination, while praiseworthy, could recall the most quoted line of
Alexander Pope, 4 particularly as the fact that neither a long history of
doctrinal dispute nor an absence of practice and precedent deterred the
Commission from proferring a solution.
Rather than attempting a necessarily superficial survey of all the draft
articles, concentration upon a single article which deals with a subject of
long-standing controversy may be valuable in demonstrating how the interaction of study, investigation, comment and revision over a period of
twenty years has fashioned a provision that is reasonable and generally
accepted through a reconciliation of doctrinal differences.
Article 43 of the Commission's draft deals with a dispute of substantial
antiquity-not dating back to Guelph and Ghibelline but certainly with
roots in the divine right of kings-the conflict between constitutional limita-

3
State responsibility and state succession are excluded by Article 69; international
organizations
by Article I as complicated by Articles 3 and 4.
4
Fssay on Criticism, Part II, line 66.
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tions upon authority to commit the State internationally and the necessity
of international reliance upon apparent authority to commit the State internationally.
The International Law Commission's draft Article 43 provided:
"A state may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has
been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation of
its internal law was manifest." 5
This text is a middle ground between opposing schools of thought
classically grouped under the convenient umbrellas of monism and dualism.
The monists, holding the view that internal law and international law are
one, deduced from this concept of unity that international commitments
which did not meet internal limitations on making treaties are unlawful
because of a failure of consent. The dualists, holding the distinctness of
internal and international law, concluded that while a treaty obligation may
be invalid internally because of failure to comply with constitutional requirements, the international obligation is unimpaired if it measures up to
international law requirements, because those requirements do not comprehend any referent to the internal law. There is an essential bootstraps
element in each position because the conclusion depends upon acceptance
of a semantic assumption.
The sharp opposition of these positions was blurred by adherents on
each side who sought to introduce various elements of reasonableness into
these exercises in pure reason. The Commentary to the Commission's draft
Article 43 suggests that there are not two, but three, major schools of
thought. The first of these is the strict monist view, which is described as
holding that "internal laws limiting the power of state organs to enter into
treaties are to be considered part of international law so as to avoid, or at
least render voidable, any consent to a treaty given on the international
plane in disregard of a constitutional limitation; the agent purporting to
bind the state in breach of the constitution is totally incompetent in inter6
national as well as national law to express its consent to the treaty."
The second school of thought postulates a modified monism: ". . . good
faith requires that only notorious constitutional limitations with which
other states can reasonably be expected to acquaint themselves should be
taken into account. In this view, a state contesting the validity of a treaty
on constitutional grounds may invoke only those provisions of the con' 7
stitution which are notorious.
561
6
7

AM. J. INT'L L. 394.

d. at 394-95.

1d. at 395.
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The third group, the dualists, consider "that international law leaves to
each state the determination of the organs and procedures by which its will
to conclude treaties is formed, and is itself concerned exclusively with the
external manifestations of this will on the international plane .... Under
this view, failure to comply with internal requirements may entail the
invalidity of the treaty as domestic law, and may also render the agent
liable to legal consequences under domestic law; but it does not affect the
validity of the treaty in international law so long as the agent acted within
8
the scope of his authority under international law."
Immediately following discussion of the dualist position the Commentary points out that some dualists would ". . . modify the stringency of
the rule in cases where the other state is actually aware of the failure to
comply with internal law or where the lack of constitutional authority is so
manifest that the other state must be deemed to have been aware of it. As
the basic principle ... is that a state is entitled to assume the regularity of
what is done within the authority possessed by an agent under international
law, it is logical enough that the state should not be able to do so when it
knows, or must in law be assumed to know, that in the particular case the
authority does not exist." 9 This is really so substantial a variation that it
constitutes a different logical approach.
Another major variant not discussed in the Commentary is the position
set forth in the Harvard Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties as
Article 2 1:
"A State is not bound by a treaty made on its behalf by an organ or authority
not competent under its law to conclude the treaty; however, a State may be
responsible for an injury resulting to another State from reasonable reliance by
that such organ or authority was competent to
the latter upon a representation
10
conclude the treaty."
The Commentary to Article 21 of the Harvard Draft reviewed to a
limited extent legal writings, state practice and jurisprudence regarding the
constitutional issue, and reached the conclusion that the preponderance of
authority at that stage supported the position regarding lack of competence
to conclude a treaty in the face of a direct constitutional inhibition.
The basis for the clause regarding responsibility for injury due to reliance upon a representation of competence to conclude a treaty is not
discussed in detail or supported by reference to any substantial array of
authority. The only citations are in support of the requirement that there
8

1d. at 396.

9

1d. at 396.
l0ll Harvard Draft Convention, 992.
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must be "reasonable reliance." The Commentary suggests the circumstances in which international responsibility would arise by the following
quotation from Lord McNair's introductory essay to Arnold's
Treaty-Making Procedure:
"It seems more reasonable to adopt the latter view [that is, "State B is only
bound to know those matters of common knowledge, and, in the absence of
specific notice, cannot be deemed to have notice of other and less obvious
provisions"], and to say that in concluding it if one party produces an instrument "complete and regular on the face of it" (to borrow an expression
from another department of law) though in fact constitutionally defective, the
other party, if it is ignorant and reasonably ignorant of the defect, is entitled to
assume that the instrument is in order, and to hold the former to the obligations
of the treaty. If that view is correct, then the repudiation of such a treaty
constitutes an international wrong.""
If this is the proper explanation of the effect of Harvard Draft Article 21
(and it appears to be the most reasonable conclusion) then the collective
authors of the Harvard Draft and the collective authors of the International
Law Commission draft Article 43 have reached, from different premises
and by different routes, nearly the same end result. The difference is more
one of style, negative formulation versus positive formulation, than content.
Article 43, of course, is not concerned with the question of state responsibility-a subject expressly excluded from the reach of the Commission's
draft by Article 69. It deals with the acceptability of a claim that a treaty is
invalid. It provides, under certain circumstances, a basis for relief from the
obligation of performance. The requirements of the Harvard Draft and the
Commission's draft are substantially identical. If there has been reasonable
reliance upon a representation of competence, the constitutional violation
is not an adequate excuse for non-performance of the treaty obligation.
Non-performance under these conditions would be a breach of agreement
and the solution moves from the ambit of treaty law to the yet uncertain
perimeters of state responsibility.
The existence of these four or five contendinj schools occasioned for
many years a good deal more heat than light. A variety of eminent scholars
took very firm positions upon the basis of rather sparse knowledge. Nothing is more illustrative of the difficulties in dealing with a subject so open to
differences than the fact that each of the four Special Rapporteurs for the
Law of Treaties took a substantially different view of the proper rule. A
process of investigation, inquiry, argument and refinement, both in and out
"61 AM.J. INT'L L. 1009.
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 4, No. I
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of the Commission over a fifteen-year period, developed a position which is
in harmony with the requirements of the present-day world, and which is
recognized as such by the vast majority of those concerned with the effects
of draft Article 43.
The first expression of position by the Commission appears not in the
context of the Law of Treaties, but in the major product of the first session
in 1949, the Draft Declarationon Rights and Duties of States. Article 13
of the Declaration provides:

"Every State has the duty to carry out in good faith its obligations arising
from treaties and other sources of international law, and it may not invoke
provisions in its constitution or its laws as an excuse for failure to perform this
duty."12
The language employed contains an element of ambiguity, as it does not
distinguish between constitutional limitations on the power to conclude as
distinguished from the power to execute treaties. The discussion in the
Commission on Articles 11 and 12 (subsequently combined into Article
13) supports the view that both aspects were under consideration:
"7. The CHAIRMAN recalled that the provision in the second part of
Article 12 had been taken from an advisory opinion of the Permanent Court of
International Justice,, the authority of which could not be challenged. He
advocated the inclusion of that provision in Article II concerning the observation of treaties. He recalled, however, that there was a theory according to
which obligations arising from treaties concluded contrary to the constitution
of a State did not bind the Contracting State. Anzilotti opposed that theory and
regarded treaties as binding upon their signatories in every case. That had been
expressly stated in the Eastern Greenland affair.
"8. At all events, the CHAIRMAN considered that if the first theory were
admitted it would be necessary to add after the word "obligations" in article
12, the words "apart from treaties" to avoid repeating what had already been
included in article 11.
"9. Mr. CORDOVA thought that since treaties were theoretically always
concluded in accordance with the constitutional laws of the Contracting State,
they were necessarily binding upon those States.
"10. Mr. SPIROPOULOS went further and considered that every treaty,
even if not in accordance with domestic constitutional law, was binding on the
parties according to international law.

01
speech
Treatment of Polish nationals and other persons of Polish origin or
13
in the Danzig territory. Advisory Opinion No. 23, February 4, 1932."

In light of this 1949 position it is somewhat surprising that the first draft
article on the issue, approved tentatively by the Commission in 1951,

121LC REPORT(1949)8.
13

1LC YEARBOOK (1949)

105.
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apparently accepted the strict monist position. In 1950, the Special Rapporteur, Professor J. L. Brierly, had proposed a formula in Article 4(1) that
"the capacity of a State or international organization to make treaties may
be exercised by whatever organ or organs of that State or organization its
constitution may provide."'1 4 Professor Brierly's discussion of the theory
was succinct. He concluded:
"In view of the division of opinion as to the international legal effect of
restriction of capacity to make treaties or of regulation of its exercise in the
constitutions of States, it is open to the draftsman of a code of the law of
5
treaties to take up any one of three attitudes on the matter."'
The three choices were (a) strict monist, (b) strict dualist, or (c) "implied
warranty." This last was excluded on the ground that it could not ". . . be
applied to international organizations without serious modifications."
In the discussion of Article 4, Judge Manley 0. Hudson gave a classic
summing up of the difficulties that surround the problem of constitutionality in international law:
"Mr. HUDSON admitted that the exercise of the capacity to make treaties
was a knotty problem. To illustrate the difficulty, he cited a hypothetical case
of the Chairman going to the United States to negotiate a treaty with the
United States on behalf of France. One fine day he might wonder what person
or what organ in the United States had the power to negotiate and conclude
such a treaty. If the Chairman asked him personally who or what was that
person or organ, he would hand him the American Constitution of 1787, asking
him to read it, as it determined what persons or organs were invested with the
power to negotiate or conclude treaties. But he must not merely read the
Constitution; he must read it in the light of the 340 volumes containing the
judgments of the Supreme Court, and in the light of agreements concluded over
a period of nearly 170 years. The Chairman would go back home and study all
that documentation. He would be obliged to do so, since he would be unable to
form a clear opinion on the point in question until he had digested the documents. It was a question which Mr. Hudson had been engaged in studying for a
long time; and he had often been asked his opinion on the subject. He had also
found that the question was settled quite differently in the various countries.
According to one interpretation the constitutional provisions relating to
treaty-making capacity were of concern to the State in question alone, and not
to other States with which it negotiated treaties. At the moment he thought it
would be impossible for the Commission to give an accurate and unanimous
6
opinion on that point."'
The draft article was reviewed in the course of the third session of the
Commission. The Commission tentatively adopted, without much discussion, the following Article 2:
1411

ILC YEARBOOK (1950) 230.

151d. at 23 1.
161 ILC YEARBOOK

(1950) 88.
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"A treaty becomes binding in relation to a State by signature, ratification,
accession or any other means of expressing the will of the State, in accordance
law and practice through an organ competent for that
with its constitutional
17
purpose."'

Hersch Lauterpacht replaced Professor Brierly, both on the Commission
and as Special Rapporteur for Treaties in 1952. In 1953 he submitted a
revised set of articles "intended primarily as a formulation of existing law".
In view of this objective, it is interesting that Article 11, Constitutional
limitations on the treaty-making power, basically incorporates the Harvard
Draft position:
"I. A treaty is voidable, at the option of the party concerned, if it has been
entered in disregard of the limitations of its constitutional law and practice.
"3. In cases in which a treaty is held to be invalid on account of disregard of
the constitutional limitations imposed by the law or practice of a contracting
party that party is responsible for any resulting damage to the other contracting
party which cannot properly be held to have been affected with knowledge of
the constitutional limitations in question."' 8
Lauterpacht accompanied draft Article
length of which he defended as follows:

11

with a Commentary the

"Note
The length of the preceding comment is partly explained by the fact that the
statement of the law in Article II departs from the view adopted by the
Commission in article 4 as tentatively formulated by it. Apparently the Commission regarded treaties concluded in disregard of constitutional limitations as
being invalid tout court. The comment of the Commission on that article states
that the view adopted therein is held by the majority of writers. This, in the
opinion of the Rapporteur, is not the case. The article as provisionally adopted
by the Commission has the apparent merit of clarity and precision. It would be,
to some extent, acceptable if constitutional limitations of the treaty-making
power in various countries were precise, well known, and easily ascertainable.
However, the contrary is the case. In view of this any solution which treats,
without any qualifications, non-observance of constitutional limitations as the
decisive and the only factor may result in introducing into the field of the law of
treaties an element of arbitrariness and abuse. This might also be the result of a
rule which would make it possible for Governments to avoid their treaties, on
the ground of unconstitutionality, regardless of their conduct prior and subsequent to their conclusion."' 19
In the Commentary itself, Lauterpacht expresses the view that, despite
the substantial variations in theoretical position which divided legal schol-

171 ILC YEARBOOK (1957) 153-55.
1811 ILC YEARBOOK (1953) 141.
9

1 1d. at 146.
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ars, draft Article II was supported both "by the bulk of practice" and "by
20
the majority of writers."
With all due respect to the eminence of the Special Rapporteur, there
was no majority support for the liability feature of the article, either among
scholars or in State practice. The practical utility of determining legal
issues through balancing the number of legal pundits on one side as against
the number on the other side appears somewhat suspect. But, for what it is
worth, the school of writers supporting the "sufficiently notorious" doctrine certainly counterbalanced the Harvard Draft school among the monists, and the adherents of dualism were no inconsequential group.
Insofar as practice is concerned, Lauterpacht's Commentary itself negates support for his position. "It is also probably for some such reasons
that the practice of Governments shows relatively few instances of attempts to avoid a treaty by reference to alleged disregard of constitutional
limitations." '21 The same holds true for jurisprudence. "The paucity and the
inconclusiveness of the judicial and arbitral pronouncements on the subject
make it difficult to deduce from them any rule of international law which is
22
calculated to provide a practical solution of the problem involved."
The Lauterpacht proposals were never seriously discussed by the Commission. In 1954, the sixth session was engaged primarily with the Law of
the Sea and the Law of Treaties was not taken up. Lauterpacht was then
wafted to the ICJ, and succeeded in the seventh session by Sir Gerald
Fitzmaurice, who also inherited the post of Special Rapporteur for the Law
of Treaties.
This same period marked the first efforts of the United Nations to verify
the actual practice and position of States. In January 1951 the Secretary
General sent a letter to all member governments requesting information
regarding their treaty-making powers and practices. Based on the replies to
this letter and other research the volume LAWS AND PRACTICES CONwas published in 1953
OF TREATIES
THE CONCLUSION
CERNING
(ST/LEG/SER.B/3). While the replies from governments were incomplete,
the Commentaries of a number of governments provided valuable evidence
that things are not always what they seem, and that the existence of quite
specific constitutional limitations on governmental authority to enter into
various types of agreement is not considered by the governments subject to
the limitations as a barrier to the assumption of binding international
obligations.
2011 ILC YEARBOOK (1953) 142.
21

1d. at 143.
1d. at 144.

22
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A striking example is Article 68 of the Belgian Constitution of 7 February 1831. This article was the prototype of a variety of constitutional
limitations on the treaty-making power of sovereigns.
"Article 68:-Le Roi fait les trait~s de paix, d'alliance et de commerce. It en
donne connaissance aux Chambres aussit6t que I' int~r~t et la sfiret6 de l'Etat
le permettent, en y joignant les communications convenables.
Les trait~s de commerce et ceux qui pouraient grever t'Etat ou lier individuellement des Belges, n'ont d'effet qu'apr6s avoir requ t'assentiment des
Chambres.
Nul cession, nul 6change, nulle adjonction de territoire ne peut avoir lieu
qu'en vertu d'une loi. Dans aucun cas, les articles secret d'un trait6 ne peuvent
&tre destructifs des articles patents." 23
This is a considerably more precise rule, for example, than Article 11,
Section 2, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution. A substantial number of jurists have considered it to be the type of requirement which would
bring into play the "sufficiently notorious principle."
The Belgian jurist, Charles de Visscher, in THEORY AND REALITY IN
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (1957), p. 248, describes this principle in
words that could have been chosen with the Belgian constitutional requirement in mind. "... . an international treaty concluded by the Head of State
without observing the rules of procedure for formulating the State's will
(extrinsic constitutionality) is not binding upon the State, provided those
rules, set out in a text, are sufficiently notorious." It might be noted that de
VISSERIANA, p. 98). This is not, however, the position taken by the Belgian
government in its submission to the United Nations:
"Lorsque I'assentiment des Chambres est requis pour que la convention
sorte ses effets, la ratification du Chef de t'Etat n'intervient g6n6ralement que

torsque cet assentiment est acquis. Cette pr6caution est prise pour 6viter
t'impasse oiJ conduirait le refus des Chambres d'approuver une convention qui
lierait la Belgique vis-.-vis d'autres Etats; elle n'est cependant pas n6cessaire
en droit international, et en certains cas urgents la ratification a 6t6 donn6e
avant I'appropbation des Chambres." 24
The juridical basis for this somewhat pragmatic statement of position is
developed by Paul de Visscher in DE LA CONCLUSION DES TRAITtS INTER
NATIONAUX, Brussels, 1943, p. 42 et seq.
The draft articles submitted by Fitzmaurice represented a complete
reversion to the dualist approach. In his first report, submitted in 1956,
Article 9 laid out the position in quite unambiguous language:
23

UNITED NATIONS, Laws and Practices Concerning the Conclusion of Treaties,
1953,2414.
1d. at 16.
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"1. Treaty-making and all other acts connected with treaties are, on the
internationalplane, executive acts, and the function of the executive authority.
Whatever legislative processes have to be gone through in order to make such
acts effective on the domestic plane, on the international plane they are authentic.
"2. On the international plane, therefore, the treaty-making power is exercised:
(a) In the case of a State, by the competent executive authority (Head of
State, government): it is for each State to determine for itself what constitutional processes are necessary in order to place the executive authority in
a position, on the domestic plane, to exercise this power; but, on the international plane, its exercise is the act of the executive authority;...
"3. No State is obliged, or, strictly speaking, entitled, to accept as internationally authentic the acts of another State in relation to a treaty, unless they
are the acts of the executive authority; but because a State is bound to accept
them if they are of this character, they necessarily bind the State whence they
emanate, which, having performed them through
its executive authority, may
25
not then deny their international authenticity."
In his Commentary Fitzmaurice relies on no authority except his ipse
dixit. It represented, of course, long-held views, expressed as early as 1934
26
in Do Treaties Need Ratification?
There had been a growing concern with the monist position during the
1950s, which undoubtedly had been fertilized by the results of the UN
Secretariat inquiries. Another inquiry under UN auspices was carried out
by the International Committee of Comparative Law with Paul Guggenheim as Rapporteur. This Survey on the Ways in Which States Interpret
Their International Obligations reached the following conclusion on the
constitutionality issue:
"2. Constitutional provisions limiting the State's competence to accept international obligations are only of relative value with regard to obligations resulting from international law. It is, in fact, generally admitted that a State is also
internationally responsible for damage caused by acts contrary to international
obligations, performed by organs of the said State acting outside the field of
their competence27but in their official capacity, provided that their incompetence
is not manifest."
The same thesis is expressed with somewhat greater clarity in the body
of the report.
".... Consequently, if an organ habitually functioning as an authorized representative of the State concludes an international convention outside the sphere
of its competence-provided that its incompetence is not manifest-the other

2511 ILC YEARBOOK (1956) 105-09.
2615 BRrrISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

27

UNESCO Report and Papers on the Social Sciences No. 1,(1955) 18.
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States concerned
are entitled to regard it as competent to conclude the said
28
convention."

The summary of discussion outlines the concerns which led the participants to move toward a formula of "manifest incompetence."
"(2) During the symposium, Mr. Green, who incidentally, showed that this
problem is non-existent in countries without a written constitution, such as the
United Kingdom, raised the question of the interpretation to be placed on
"manifest incompetence" and asked whether it was incumbent on government
representatives to make a study of the constitutional law of the other
contracting State. He quoted examples where interpretation was difficult-particularly in the case of ignorance of the language in which the constitution of the other States was written ...The Rapporteur declined to
give an interpretation of the word "manifest" and quoted the empirical procedure of constitutional practice in this connexion. Messrs. Ago and Paul de
Visscher drew attention to the difference between the formation of the will of
the State-a question which comes under municipal and not under international
law-and the manifestation of that will which, on the contrary, does fall within
the sphere of international law, even though municipal law may have to be
consulted in order to determine the conditions of its validity. They therefore
stressed that international responsibility exists-except in cases of manifest
incompetence-when the expression of a country's will is valid, conforming to
the criteria adopted by international law, even though that29 will has not been
formed in accordance with the principles of municipal law."
The conclusion of the Committee is very close to the formula eventually
adopted by the International Law Commission.
Due to concentration by the International Law Commission on Law of
the Sea and Diplomatic and Consular Privileges and Immunities, the draft
submitted by Fitzmaurice was not taken up before his election to the
International Court of Justice in 1960.
That same year saw the publication of a most thorough and penetrating
investigation of the entire subject of the relationship between treaties and
internal law-TREATY-MAKING POWER by Hans Blix. This volume reviewed in depth not only the constitutional issue but also the closely allied
problems of the authority of revolutionary governments, of governments-in-exile and of transitional governments. The bulk of the book,
however, concentrates upon the question of the effect of constitutional

limitations. The material in the UN compilation

LAWS AND PRACTICES is

examined at length in order to determine what interrelationships actually
exist. This examination resulted in the following conclusion:
"The fundamental fact emerges from the examination of the whole material,
that of some eighty-five provisions reproduced and practices described in the
2

1/d. at 8.
/d.at 8.

29
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cited collection, the vast majority-some seventy-merely prescribe the procedure to be followed in the conclusion of treaties, and lay down the division of
dealing with the
duties between the various organs of states, without expressly
30
situation which arises when the regulations are violated."
Blix develops the material to illustrate that the conclusions drawn by
writers of the monist school, in particular Chailley, as to the effect of
constitutional limitations on international validity are not in many cases in
accord with governmental and judicial authority. Of the constitutions reviewed, he concludes that only the Irish and the Norwegian clearly show
an intent that "certain unconstitutional features make treaties invalid internationally." 3 1 In addition he lists three probables, Denmark, Costa Rice
and Greece, and a possibility, Lebanon. Blix summarizes his factual
findings as follows:
"It is submitted, on the basis of the foregoing examination of international
practice, that the evidence of a practice treating constitutional provisions as not
directly relevant in international law is both quantitatively and qualitatively
more significant than that pointing to the direct relevance of municipal provisions.
"The fact is conspicuous that no treaty has been found that has been
admitted to be invalid or held by an international tribunal to be invalid, because
concluded by a constitutionally incompetent authority or in an unconstitutional
manner, either by an individual government in bilateral relations, or by an
international organization, like the League of Nations. Furthermore, there is no
lack of treaties made in violation of constitutions, or by constitutionally invalid under international law.
competent authorities, and yet admitted to ' be
32
Some such cases have been recorded above.
In summing up, Blix surveys the various theoretical approaches, and
remarks that "it would be an exaggeration to maintain that any unmistakable conclusion has emerged ... It is obviousthat the rule regulating the
question is not a settled one..." Blix then suggests that what practice does
support is a "criterion of apparent ability."
"The authorities whose consent to treaties are sought and accepted as
sufficient to bind a state are, in practice, invariably those that appear actually
able to secure performance of treaty obligations without, at the same time,
necessarily being those that are constitutionally authorized to act as they do.
Thus, reliance seems normally to be placed on pledges given on the authority
of a cabinet, by a president, a prime minister, or a foreign minister, and the
cases and incidents and other evidence examined lend support to the position
law, even where conthat such reliance is warranted under international 33
stitutional precepts and provisions have been violated.."
30

BLIx, TREATY-MAKING POWER,
31

1d. at 246.
32
1d. at 373.
33

1d. at 392.
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This "criterion of apparent ability" is in accord with positions which the
government of the United States had taken over a long period. The position taken regarding the Crichfield Protocol (U.S.-Venezuelan Claims Settlement of 1909), 3 4 and the position taken by Secretary Stimson in 1931
regarding the Bryan-Chamarro Nicaraguan Canal Treaty of 1914,35 are

clearly within the ambit of an apparent-authority rule.
A letter of January 24, 1950, from Adrian S. Fisher, then Legal Adviser
of the State Department, to the Administrator of General Services, contains a frequently-quoted statement:
"This Department has taken the position that any agreement signed on
behalf of a foreign government by a person whom that government officially
designates as authorized to sign such an agreement is fully binding on such

government. This Department accepts the advice of the duly recognized chiefs
of the diplomatic missions of foreign governments and as to the extent of such
authority. A chief of mission who signs an agreement is assumed to be acting
within his authority. Even if, under the domestic law of his country, he, or a
person whom he has certified as qualified to act, may have exceeded his
authority, his government would not be excused from performing under the
agreement."
The point at issue was a practice of some U. S. Government agencies
querrying the authority of foreign officials and ambassadors to sign particular agreements (in this case a U. S.-French Surplus Property Credit Agreement).
Another important indication of a position is the fact that the Senate
Judiciary Committee, in its report on the Bricker Amendment, made it
crystal clear that the limiting effects of Section I of the proposed amendment were to apply only internally. Section 1 provided:
"Section I. A provision of a treaty or other international agreement which
conflicts36with any provision of this Constitution shall not be of any force or
effect."
The Committee Report stated:
...
The words 'shall not be of any force or effect' mean that the agreement
will be void insofar as the municipal or domestic aspects of the agreement are
concerned. The committee wishes to point out that the international obligations
of the treaty are not affected by this language for the external force and effect
by international law and usage rather than by
of such agreements are governed
37

constitutional provisions."

34V HACKWORTH DIGEST
35

156.

/d. at 155.
6

3 84th Cong., 2d Sess., S. P.1716, p. I.
37
1d. at I I.
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This was as unambiguous a recognition by the Judiciary Committee of
the need to preserve the international stability of treaties as could be found.
And it was a recognition made under unusual conditions which militated
against the adoption of such a position.
The conclusions reached by Blix were more limited, of course, than the
Fitzmaurice approach. This completely dualist position was never formally
considered by the International Law Commission. Some aspects of his
reports were reviewed at the eleventh session in 1959 but the internal
versus international law aspect was not taken up.
Sir Humphrey Waldock became the fourth, and final, Special Rapporteur
for the Law of Treaties in 1961. His initial position regarding the constitutional limitations was set forth in Article 5 of his Second Report
submitted to the International Law Commission in 1963. It was a meticulously drafted proposal that, reduced to its essentials, made failure to
comply with constitutional limitations a defense only if resultant lack of
authority was known or manifest. 38 Waldock's Commentary on the article
contains an excellent summary of the contending schools of thought and a
succinct explanation of their various failings. Thus, with regard to the
"notorious" constitutional limitation he remarks:
"The notion that a distinction can readily be made between notorious and
non-notorious constitutional limitations is to a large extent an illusion. Admittedly, there now exist collections of the texts of State constitutions and the
United Nations has issued a volume of "Laws and Practices Concerning the
Conclusion of Treaties" based on information, supplied by a considerable
number of States. Unfortunately, however, neither the texts of constitutions
nor the information made available by the United Nations are by any means
sufficient to enable foreign States to appreciate with any degree of certainty
whether or not a particular treaty falls within a constitutional provision. Some
provisions are capable of subjective interpretation, such as a requirement that
"political" treaties or treaties of "special importance" should be submitted to
the legislature; some constitutions do not make clear on their face whether the
limitation refers to the power to conclude the treaty or to its effectiveness
within domestic law. But even when the constitutional provisions are apparently uncomplicated and precise, the superficial clarity and notoriety of the limitations may be quite deceptive, as in the case of the United States Constitution.
In the majority of cases where the constitution itself contains apparently strict
and precise limitations, it has nevertheless been found necessary to admit a
wide freedom for the executive to conclude treaties in simplified form without
following the strict procedures prescribed in the constitution; and this use of
the treaty-making power is only reconciled with the letter of the constitution
either by a process of interpretation or by the development of political understandings." 39
3811 ILC YEARBOOK (1963) 41.
39
1d. at 42.
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With respect to the monist approach generally, Waldock concludes:
"The majority of writers adopting the constitutional approach to the problem
appear to have arrived at their conclusion rather upon the basis of theory than
upon a close examination of international jurisprudence and State practice. If
the evidence from these sources is not entirely decisive, the weight of it40 seems
to point to a solution based upon the position taken by the third group."
The third group referred to is the dualist school.
Undoubtedly Waldock is motivated in some part by his conclusion that:
"The majority of the diplomatic incidents in which States have invoked their
constitutional requirements as a ground of invalidity have been cases in which
for quite other reasons they have desired to escape from their obligations under
the treaty. Furthermore, in most of these cases the other party to the dispute
has contested the view that non-compliance with constitutional provisions
could afterwards be made a ground for invalidating a treaty which had been
concluded by representatives ostensibly possessing the authority of the State to
conclude it. Where a Government has genuinely found itself in constitutional
difficulties after concluding a treaty and has raised the matter promptly, it
appears normally to be able to get the constitutional obstacle removed by
internal action and to obtain any necessary indulgence in the meanwhile from
'41
other parties. "

Article 5 was the first of the draft articles discussed in the fifteenth
session of the Commission. Three meetings, the 674th through 676th, were
devoted to thorough debate of the varying approaches to the problem.
There was an overwhelming majority in favor of the "internationalist"
point of view. The view was expressed repeatedly that paragraph 4 was an
unnecessary complication and involved only extremely rare cases.
Andr6 Gros, the Legal Adviser of the French Foreign Office, summed
up the practical aspects of the opposition to paragraph 4:
"Article 5, as conceived by the Special Rapporteur, dealt with treaties
improperly concluded or ratified by reason of the fact that the representation of
one of the parties had been only ostensibly valid. There were now so many
general, multilateral and bilateral treaties that it was doubtful whether, juridically and in practice, any other rule could be followed than that of trust in
appearances, for obvious reasons connected with the maintenance of good
international relations in accordance with the principle of non-intervention in
the domestic affairs of States and for convenience in negotiation; the opposite
rule would mean verifying not only that the 42
powers of all negotiators were in
order, but also that they were constitutional.1
Marcel Cadieux of Canada provided an interesting footnote to this
aspect.
40

1d. at 43.
/d. at 45.
421 ILC YFARBOOK (1963) 9.
41
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".... His own country's constitution was so complex that there were always
some provisions it could invoke if it wished to elude its obligations. But the
rule of law should be fostered and governments encouraged to act with prudence, to accept the responsibilities for their decisions and to refrain from
trying to shift them onto their partners in international negotiations or onto the
43
international community.."
The only members of the Commission who urged unqualified adherence
to the monist position were Yasseen of Iraq and Paredes of Ecuador. The
example cited by Paredes in support of his position is illuminating.
"There was, moreover,-serious danger in drawing a distinction between the
international validity and the internal validity of a treaty. For example, a loan
agreement might be entered into by a head of State, without consulting the
competent constitutional organs. If it was desired to obtain repayment of the
loan and a claim was brought before the courts of the State concerned, it would
inevitably be rejected; the courts would say that the loan agreement was void
44
and had no effect in municipal law. "
Article 5 was shortened in the drafting committee. The discussion of the
revised draft in the Commission emphasized that the article was a compromise of opposing viewpoints. There were a number of complaints about
the drafting and the Commission accepted the text subject to further
redrafting by a vote of eighteen to none with three abstentions.
The redrafted text was considered at the 716th meeting and the following was adopted unanimously:
"When the consent of a State to be bound by a treaty has been expressed by
a representative considered under the provisions of article 4 of Part I to be
furnished with the necessary authority, the fact that a provision of the internal
law of the State regarding the procedures for entering into treaties has not been
complied with shall not invalidate the consent expressed by its representative,
unless the violation of its internal law was manifest. Except in the latter case, a
State may not withdraw the consent expressed by its representative unless the
'45
other parties to the treaty so agree. "
In the Commission's report to the General Assembly, Article 5 became
Article 3 1. The draft articles were submitted to member governments for
an expression of opinion and national positions were also expressed in the
Sixth Committee of the General Assembly. The reactions to Article 31
were discussed by the Special Rapporteur in his fourth report.
"Seventeen of the Governments and delegations which have commented on
the present article express themselves in favour of the rule proposed by the
Commission while making suggestions for improving its formulation. Seven
43

1d. at 5.
441d. at 11.
45

1d. at 298.

International Lawyer, Vol. 4, No. I

18

INTERNATIONAL

LAWYER

Governments and delegations, on the other hand, appear to be opposed to that
rule, considering that greater importance should be given to the role of constitutional law as an element in the formation ofa State's consent to be bound
by a treaty. Three delegations do not make their position plain on the central
question of principle. In these circumstances the Special Rapporteur thinks
that his proper course is to assume the maintenance of the rule adopted in 1962
but to try to improve its formulation in the46light of the points made in the
comments of Governments and delegations."
The seven States which expressed opposition were Burma, Uganda,
Iraq, Italy, Thailand, the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia. The
presence of Italy is somewhat surprising in light of the eminent Italian
jurists, headed by Anzilotti, who supported the "internationalist" position.
After reviewing the suggestions for redrafting the article, Waldock proposed a somewhat shorter text. This revision was considered at the 823rd
47
session on January 4, 1966, and found general acceptance. The article
was referred to the drafting committee. When it reappeared, it had reassumed the outlines of the 1963 draft. There was a brief discussion, followed by adoption, sixteen votes to none, with two abstentions, of the text set
forth in the Commission's final report on the Law of Treaties as Article 43,
which will be repeated to refresh the reader's recollection:
"A State may not invoke the fact that its c nsent to be bound by a treaty has
been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation of
its internal law was manifest."
The Commentary on the article is an abbreviated version of the earlier
explanations of the Special Rapporteur with certain addenda. One of these
in commenting on government positions is of special interest:
"Some Governments suggested that the text should indicate, on the one
hand, to whom the violation must be manifest for the purpose of bringing the
exception into play, and, on the other, what constitutes a "manifest violation".
The Commission considered, however, that it is unnecessary to specify further
to whom the violation must be manifest. The rule embodied in the article is
that, when the violation of internal law regarding competence to conclude
treaties would be objectively evident to any State dealing with the matter
normally and in good faith, the consent48 to the treaty purported to be given on
behalf of the State may be repudiated.."
The comments received from governments regarding Article 43, and the
statements of delegates in the Sixth Committee, paralleled the positions
which had been taken on the earlier draft. There was again a heavy
4611 ILC YEARBOOK (1965) 70.
471 ILC YEARBOOK (1966) Part 1, 124.
4861 AM. J. INTER'L L. 399.
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majority in support of the view that international commitments should be
subject only exceptionally to internal limitations, mixed with expressions of
concern regarding clarity and, in particular, the difficulty of determining
when a violation would be "manifest."
The major published Commentary on the Commission's Article 43 appeared in the special edition of the Max Planck Institute's Zeitschrift fur
Auslindishes Offentliches Recht und Volkerrecht of October 1967 (Vol.
27, No. 3). The paper is by Dr. Wilhelm Karl Geck, who had in 1963
published a volume Die Volkerrechtlichen Wirkungen Vetfassungswvidriger
Vertrage which supported the "internationalist" position and, in many
respects, coincided with the views put forward by Blix. In the article, Geck
concentrates on the need to distinguish between rules on "the international
formation of will (Willensbildung)" and those of internal law "on the
authority to express consent (Erklirungsbefugnis)." He concludes that the
manifest violation principle of the International Law Commission is not a
sufficient distinction. He remarks:
"It is not surprising that, in the disputes which have arisen in international
practice, the States which have asserted the invalidity of a treaty on the
grounds of a violation of their constitutional law, have done so mostly not out
of an abstract concern for the protection of their laws, but rather because of a
concrete political or economic interest to be rid of a treaty obligation which has
become inconvenient to them. Nor can one rely on the argument that international disputes of this nature have not been very numerous. The number of
international treaties has grown enormously with the increase in the number of
States (the United Nations Treaty Series contains at the moment some 8,600
treaties in 548 volumes). The constitutional and political situation in many
countries is neither clear nor stable. In a world where national sovereignty is
sometimes regarded as a justification for evading political or economic treaty
law,
obligations, there is a danger that States will, by relying on their national
49
seek to rid themselves of treaty bonds which no longer suit them.."

His proposed redraft of the article basically relies on the authority of heads
of state and on full powers issued by heads of state. This and similar
proposals increase certainty but only by ignoring the facts of contemporary
treaty practice regarding agreements in simplified form.
At the Treaties Conference the line-up which the International
Law Commission had displayed in microcosm now appeared in a worldwide context. A series of amendments was proposed. Japan and Pakistan
supported deletion of the manifest violation requirement
(A/Conf.39/C.I/L.184 and Add.l). This proposal received a substantial
amount of support, especially from Blix, who, as head of the Swedish
4927 ZEIISCHRIFT 445.
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delegation, argued strongly in its favor. There was no amendment submitted that took the position that internal law should govern. Venezuela
proposed an amendment to reverse the negative implication of the article
and give positive expression to the claim of invalidity. There was practically no support for this proposal and it was withdrawn
(A/Conf.39/C.l/10). Iran put forward an amendment based on the head of
state theory which likewise was withdrawn in the face of negative reaction
(A/Conf.39/C.I/L.252), as were amendments to require prompt notification of any claim based on constitutional objections (Philippines,
A/Conf.39/C.I/L.239). Australia (A/Conf.39/C. I/L.271/Rev. 1) proposed a
year's statute of limitations which lost 44 to 20 with 27 abstentions.
Two amendments put forward by Peru (A/Conf.39/C.I/L.228), joined
subsequently by the Ukrainian S.S.R., and one by the United Kingdom
(A/Conf.39/C.I/L.274) were designed to clarify the meaning of Article
43. The Peruvian proposals were intended to make clear that the internal
law violated must be a "constitutional provision of fundamental importance." (Prov.Summary Record A/Conf.39/C. I/SR.43,p.5)
Norway, one of the few States cited by Blix in Treaty-Making Power as
having a constitutional limitation on the international validity of treaties,
announced its intention to abstain "as adoption of the article would require
a revision of the Constitution or at least a reconsideration of the prevailing
interpretation of Norwegian constitutional law." (Prov.Summary Record
A/Conf.39/C.I/SR.43,p.17) This was the only real objection made to the
principle underlying Article 43. Many of the delegates were concerned
with broadening that principle through acceptance of the Japanese-Pakistani proposal. Australia, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Cambodia, Cyprus, France, Switzerland, and Brazil spoke in favor of that
position. The amendment was, however, defeated 56 to 25 with 7 abstentions. A considerably larger number of delegates stressed the need for
greater clarity in the article. This sentiment was reflected in the adoption of
the Peruvian and United Kingdom amendments (Prov.Summary
Recordp.25).
At the 78th meeting of the Committee of the Whole, the following text of
Article 43 was adopted unanimously:
"1.A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty
has been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding
competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation
was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance.
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"2. A violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to any State
conducting itself in the matter in accordance with normal practice and in good
faith." 50
The article was adopted without change in the second session of the
conference by a vote of 93 in favor, none against, and 3 abstentions.
The history of Article 43 demonstrates that the text finally chosen was
the culmination of an extended review of all possible courses of action. Is
the solution that has been finally worked out the best available solution? It
is certainly not the rule that would have the greatest appeal to either the
fervid nationalist or the perfervid internationalist. But the all-or-nothing
approach of true believers rarely supplies a workable formula for a workaday world. When the desirable aim of upholding the stability of the
international treaty structure collides with the laudable end of placing some
domestic checks and balances upon the making of international commitments, the reasonable solution should be a compromise that protects
both sets of interests to the maximum extent.
The essential decision in reaching such a compromise is allocation of the
burden of proceeding. Should the weight of making the argument fall upon
the State that relies on its internal law to defeat a commitment or upon the
State that relies upon the latter's appearance of authority to undertake the
commitment?
The decision underlying Article 43 is to accord prima facie validity to
the appearance of authority subject to the limitation of an objectively
evident violation of a fu ndamentally important internal law. The review of
the problem has demonstrated above all that this solution is amply supported, not only by legal theory, but by consideration of practical consequences.
Article 43 is designed for a world in which the coup d'6tat and the
suspension of constitutions are endemic, but also where international business cannot be suspended until constitutional rule is restored. It is designed
for a world in which assaults upon international commitments are a standard weapon in the armory of aspiring politicians. Given the facts of
contemporary international existence, Article 43 represents the most reasonable rule for a world in which reason is not yet supreme.
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